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ABSTRACT 
     This paper analyzes commuting congestion when there is a mass transit 
and a road with a bottleneck between a residential area and a workplace . We 
investigate the optimality and efficiency of several road pricing regimes -
and obtain simple and practical rules to attain the social optimum . We then 
make a welfare comparison between these road toll regimes, and show that the 
road tolls are effective especially in case of heavy bottleneck congestion .
1. Introduction 
     It is often experienced in large cities that driving into a CBD by car 
takes much more time than driving out of a CBD during the rush hour even 
when the number of auto drivers into a CBD is less than that out of a CBD. 
This is due to the radial structure of the road network, i.e., the number of 
roads and lanes decreases as one approaches to a CBD. Roughly speaking, 
such a road network is compared to a road with a bottleneck like a 
sandglass, and cars are compared to the sands. 
     In a sandglass example, the speed of the falling sands is much faster 
than that of the accumulated sands although each speed is fixed and 
independent of the amount of the sands. In case of urban traffic, the speed 
on an uncongested road is much faster than that at the congested bottleneck 
though each speed is constant and almost independent of the number of cars. 
Consequently, the commuting time is determined solely by the length of the 
queue, and hence the number of cars during the rush hour. If a commuter 
wants to avoid such a long queue to reduce the time to commute, she has to 
arrive at the CBD much earlier or later than the start time of work. This 
is also considered to be a cost incurred by the commuter. 
     Vickrey (1969) first developed a model of such an endogenous departure 
time with bottleneck congestion, which is fully investigated by Arnott, de 
Palma and Lindsey, hereafter ADL, (1990) and Braid (1989), among others. 
This paper extends the ADL model of bottleneck congestion by introducing an 
alternative commuting mode of a mass transit which has no congestion but a 
higher fixed cost of commuting. In brief, we consider the situation that 
commuters can not only choose the departure time from home, but also select 
the transport mode between the road with a bottleneck and the mass transit. 
Using a road toll, we derive a demand function for the road service. We 
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then investigate the optimality and efficiency of several road pricing 
regimes and obtain simple rules to attain the social optimum that minimizes 
the total commuting cost, which consists of the travel time cost, the fixed 
travel cost, and the schedule delay cost. 
     In section 2, after depicting the general setting of the model, we 
examine three kinds of equilibria in each subsection: the no-toll 
equilibrium in subsection 2.1, the uniform toll equilibrium in subsection 
2.2, and the fine toll equilibrium in subsection 2.3. We make a welfare 
comparison in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
2.1 No-Toll Equilibrium 
     Between a residential area and a central business district, there are 
two commuting routes: (a) a road with a bottleneck and (b) a railway. 
Automobiles are used in the road while a mass transit is utilized on the 
railway. The number of users is denoted by Na and Nb respectively. Since 
the mass transit arrives on time (t*), its users do not have to pay the 
schedule delay costs while automobile commuters if congested have to incur 
the costs. Due to the physical constraint of the bottleneck capacity, some 
of automobile commuters necessarily arrive earlier or later than t* unless 
Na is less than the capacity. 
     When the road is free from congestion (i.e., the rate of arrival to the 
bottleneck is less than its capacity), the commuting time is assumed to be a 
constant value To. If the arrival rate exceeds the capacity, a queue 
develops. The commuting time is then written by 
                       T(t) = To + Q(t)/s, (1) 
where t is the departure time, Q(t) is the queue length measured by the 
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number of automobiles, and s is the bottleneck capacity. Let r(t) be the 
rate of departure from home, then the queue length is given by 
t 
            Q(t) _J r(u)du - s(t-to) for Q(t) > 0, (2) 
                   to 
where to is the most recent time at which there was no queue. 
     In addition to the travel time costs, the auto commuters have to incur 
the costs of schedule delay as mentioned above. Following Vickrey (1969) 
and ADL (1990a), we assume that the cost is proportional to the travel time 
and to the schedule delay. The total cost of auto commute is then expressed 
as 
  Ca = a(travel time) + 13 max(time early,0) + 7 max(time late,0) + toll, 
where the Greek letters are shadow prices of time, which are considered to 
take different values.' Specifically, the total cost is given by 
N 
         Ca = aT(t) + /3[t*-t-T(t)] for tE[to,t), (3) 
           = aT(t) + 1[t-t*+T(t)] for te(t,ti], 
N where ti is the time at which the queue ends, and t is the departure time at 
                                                                           N N 
which an individual arrives at work on time t*, i.e., t + T(t) = t*. 
     In equilibrium, every auto commuter is unable to find a departure time 
which reduces her total cost. In other words, Ca in (3) should be constant 
for all t. Hence, using (1) and (3), r(t) in (2) is solved as: 
              r(t) =- s for tE[to,t), (4) 
                     a N                      - 
a+y s for tE(t,tl], 
Substituting (4) into (2), the queue length is given by 
            Q(t) __(t-to) for tE[to,t), (5) 
                                    N N N 
                   _ Ps (t-to) - Is (t-t) for te(t,tt], 
                                                 a+~r 
Equation (4) indicates that the arrival rate is piecewise constant and 
equation (5) shows that a queue develops linearly and dissipates linearly. 
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     Now, since 
                                           N N 
                            t + T(t) = t*, 
                               Q(t1) = 0, and 
             fti                                r(u)du = Na, 
                          to 
we can determine the three unknowns as follows: 
N 
   to = t* - To - SNa 15
s t1 = t ' * - To + SNa , t = t* - To - &Na (6 )                                                      Its as , 
where &-=/31/(/3+T). Thus, the total cost per capita is obtained as 
                                Ca = SNa + aTo. (7) 
The constancy of Ca implies that no individual is able to decrease her total 
cost by changing her departure time t. 
     Let us next consider the mass transit commute. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that the total cost by mass transit Cb is constant. 
against the number of its users Nb. That is, we are assuming that increased 
passengers of the mass transit would be accommodated by increasing the 
number of vehicles without further cost.2 
     Since no individual can decrease her total cost by altering her trip 
mode, 
                                 Ca < Cb, (8) 
should always hold in equilibrium. From (7) and (8), it is straightforward 
that the equilibrium numbers of users are: 
                     (Na,Na) = (N,0) for N:Oa, (9) 
                                  = (Na,N-Na) for N>Na, 
where N[=Na+Nb] is the total number of commuters in the city, and the 
critical value Na[=s(Cb-aTo)/S] is the value that makes the equality in (8) 
hold. For future reference, we define that the city size is: 
          small if N < Na/2; 
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        medium if N E (Na/2,Na); 
         large i f N ? Na . 
     Without little loss of generality, we assume Na>0 or equivalently 
Cb>aTo so as to guarantee the need for the road. Otherwise, everyone uses 
the mass transit under any nonnegative road toll. Finally, we define the 
total social cost in this city under the no-toll equilibrium as 
                              TCe = CaNa + CbNb. (10) 
     In the next two subsections, we will introduce two kinds of road toll 
regimes: a uniform toll and a time-varying fine toll. Feasibility of these 
tolls rests on social consensus in addition to their technical conditions. 
2.2 Second Best by the Uniform Toll 
     Suppose the public authority is able to levy a uniform toll Tu from 
road users. This regime would be very common to most countries under the 
current level of technology. The total cost per road user (7) is then 
modified to 
                          Ca = Ssa + aTo + Tu (11) 
while that of a mass transit user Cb remains invariable with respect to its 
number of users Nb. Equations (8) and (11) establish an equilibrium given a 
level of the uniform toll. 
     Since commuting is a must, the trip for commute itself is perfectly 
inelastic. However, the introduction of the mass transit lets the road 
commute elastic with respect to the road toll Tu. It should be noticed that 
whereas ADL (1987) and Braid (1989) assume an elastic ,demand a priori, the 
demand function in this model is endogenously determined because a shift to 
the mass transit commute takes place here by the toll Tu. 
     Using (8) and (11), the demand for the road service Na is expressed as 
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a function of its price Tu: 
                    Na(T') = 0 for Tu ? Cb, 
                           = max{N, Na(1-Tu/Cb)) for Tu < Cb. 
Obviously, the demand function is'piecewise linear and weakly monotone 
decreasing in the road toll Tu. 
     Suppose the toll revenue is assumed to be equally redistributed to both 
users, then the total social cost in this city is redefined by 
                           TCU = CaNa + CbNb - T°Na. (12) 
The public authority minimizes (12) with respect to Tu subject to (8) and 
(11), which also determines the optimum number of users of the road and the 
mass transit. After some simple calculations, we obtain the optimal pricing 
of the uniform toll as follows: 
                   Tu = 0 for N<Na/2, 
                       = Cb - aTo for N>Na/2. (13) 2 
Put it in another way,
Proposition 1 
     In small size of 





should be levied. In medium or large 
toll (13) should be imposed.
     From the uniform toll pricing (13), the corresponding distribution of 
users of the road and mass transit is shown to be: 
                 (Na,Nb) = (N,0) for NeNa/2, (14) 
                          = (Na/2,N-Na/2) for N>Na/2. 
    Comparing the second-best distribution (14) with the no-toll 
equilibrium distribution (9), we can draw the following two propositions.
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Proposition 2 
     In medium size of cities, the public authority should construct the 
mass transit if the cost of construction is low enough. 
     This corresponds to the case of NE(Na/2,Na), where Nb=O (i.e., the mass 
transit is not demanded under no-toll equilibrium), but Nb>O (i.e., the mass 
transit is needed under the uniform toll pricing). It should be noted that 
without exercising the road toll, the mass transit is not voluntarily built 
by a private sector since no one uses the mass transit when N is less than 
Na. Needless to say, such a government intervention is justified because 
the bottleneck congestion creates the negative externality. 
    Suppose the city is in the growing stage, then it is optimal to 
construct a mass transit when N becomes Na/2 and impose the uniform toll. 
This transit may be run by a private sector only after N exceeds Na. 
     The next proposition deals with the case of large city size, where 
Na=Na/2 always holds. 
Proposition 3 
     If there are some mass transit users under no-toll equilibrium, then a 
uniform toll should be levied such that the number of road users is reduced 
to half. 
     Since mass transits are utilized in almost every large cities, the road 
toll (or a subsidy for mass transits) is necessary in those cities. The 
level of the toll should be adjusted so as to halve the number of road 
users. We would like to emphasize that the rule of Proposition 3 is so 
simple that it can be easily applied without estimating the set of 
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parameters, a, /3, 1, s, To and Cb when the uniform toll is the only possible 
policy means. 
     In conclusion, by employing the above mentioned three propositions , we 
can sum up the uniform toll pricing scheme in the following way: 
  1. Suppose there exists no-toll pricing in every city . Observe first that 
     the number of automobile commuters Na. in large cities (N>Na), where the 
     mass transit pays. 
  2. Determine the level of the uniform toll To which reduces Na by half in 
     the large cities by trial and error. 
  3. Using the value of Na, identify medium cities Ne(Na/2 ,Na). Construct a 
     mass transit there if its cost is small enough. 
  4. Apply the same level of the uniform toll To to all of medium and large 
    cities (N>Na/2). 
It seems obvious that this pricing scheme is not a mere theory . It is a 
feasible and practical scheme under limited data on urban transportation. 
Notice that the scheme is applicable to every city. 
2.3 Social Optimum by the Fine Toll 
     So far, the road toll has been assumed to be constant. However, if 
pricing technology allows the public authority to exercise a time-dependent 
fine toll, then the total social cost will be reduced further. 
Specifically, a time-varying road toll can eliminate any queue although it 
does not reduce the schedule delay costs. Employing the result by ADL 
(1990), the optimal fine toll for the road with a bottleneck is expressed 
as: 
8
             T(x,t) = 0 for t5to, 
N 
                       = x - /3(t*-t-To) for tE(to,t), 
                                                    N (15) 
                      = x - 1(t+To-t*) for tE[t,tl) , 
                     = 0 for t?tl, 
where x<SNa/s. This condition assures that commuting by automobile occurs 
only at the period [to,tl]. 
    Equation (15) implies that the fine toll is piecewise linear, and 
should be collected in proportion to the queue length (5) of no-toll 
equilibrium. If the set of the parameters is difficult to estimate in 
practice, the fine toll should be adjusted such that the arrival rate r(t) 
equals the capacity s, where the queue is about to vanish. 
     Similar to the previous subsections, the total social cost under the 
fine toll is rewritten by 
                      TCf = CbN - x2a = CbN 2                                             -
28 , (16) 
which should be minimized with respect to x by the public authority. Note 
that the second equality is due to T(x,to)=0, or x<SNa/s. The binding 
constraint is (8), which is Ca:SCb, or x<SNa/s. 
    Clearly, the minimizer of (16) is obtained as x=max{SNa/s,SN/s). As a 
result, the optimal distribution of users of the road and mass transit is 
                (Naf,Nbf) = (N,0) for N<Na, (17) 
                             = (Na,N-Na) for N?Na. 
Note that in (17), N<Na corresponds to x=6N/s and Ca<Cb (only the road is 
used), and N__>Na corresponds to x=SNa/s and Ca=Cb (both modes are used). 
    Comparing (17) with (9), we immediately witness that this social 
optimum distribution of the road and mass transit users coincides with the 
equilibrium distribution. In other words, 
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Proposition 4 
    If a fine toll (15) 
to the queue length, but 
     The distributions of 
above three kinds of toll
is feasible, 
it should not 
between the 
regimes are
then it should be levied in 
 change the number of road 
road and mass transit users 
























    Table 1 The Number of Road Users and The Number of Mass Transit 
             Users Under Three Pricing Regimes [Na=(Cb-aTo)s/b] 
    Road tolls are often criticized in that the right to use roads by 
everyone is infringed. If the above fine toll is technologically feasible, 
such criticism is misdirected. The fine toll does replace the commuting 
time cost at a queue by the toll which is to be equally redistributed to all 
commuters. 
     Notice that whereas the uniform toll eliminates a part of the queue by 
inducing some road users to convert to the mass transit, the fine toll can 
get rid of the whole queue by compelling road users to wait at home. As is 
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demonstrated in the next section, the latter toll is, of course, superior. 
3. Welfare Comparison 
    The total social costs per capita for three toll regimes are listed in 
Table 2 for comparison. It is observed that the total social cost under the 
fine toll is half the cost under the no-toll or under the uniform toll in 
small cities N(<Na/2), but that the differences in the total social costs 
gradually diminish as city size N gets larger. It is also observed that in 
small cities the uniform toll is immaterial whereas the fine toll is not. 












Cb - S(Ka-N) 
Cb - S(Na-N) 








Cb -SNa     4sN 
Cb - SNa    2sN
  Table 2 Total Social Costs Per Capita 
     In general, both the uniform and fine 
commuters want to avoid the schedule delays 
small, and/or the city size (N) is large. 
are useless when commuters do not care the 
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Under Three Pricing Regimes 
toll regimes are effective when 
 (/3, 1), the road capacity (s) is 
On the other hand, the regimes 
schedule delays, there is enough
number of road lanes, and/or the city size is small. Briefly speaking, the 
toll regimes are indispensable in highly congested cities, which is in 
accord with our intuition. 
    Following ADL (1990), let us next evaluate the relative efficiency of 
the uniform toll by the following formula: 
                                ef f': - Tce -TC' 
                                        TCe_TCf 
Substituting the-values in Table 2, we have 
                           eff`: = 0 for NSNa/2, 
                                                       N2 2 _ _                                2[1- 2N for NE(Na/2,Na), 
                                    1 f
or N?Na. 2 
It follows from this that the relative efficiency of the uniform toll 
increases monotonically from 0 to 1/2 until the city size becomes Na, and 
becomes constant after that. It is also found that the upperbound of the 
relative efficiency of the uniform toll is 50%. It is hoped that the fine 
toll regime becomes technologically feasible. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
     ADL's (1990) model provides a fundamental and operational framework in 
analyzing bottleneck congestion which is widespread in big cities. This 
paper extended the ADL's model by introducing another commuting mode. That 
is, we assumed there is a mass transit in addition to a road with a 
bottleneck both connecting a residential area and a workplace. 
     Reformulating ADL's model, we derived equilibria under the no-toll, the 
uniform toll, and the fine toll regimes respectively, and obtained several 
results. First, a governmental supply of transportation facilities is 
justified in order to reduce the negative externality of bottleneck 
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congestion. It is socially desirable to construct a mass transit and levy a 
uniform road toll by a public authority in some cases even if there were no 
demand for the transit (Proposition 2). 
     Second, suppose both modes are in use and a bottleneck queue is 
generated in no-toll equilibrium. If the uniform toll is the only feasible 
policy instrument, then it should be imposed such that the number of road 
users is reduced by half (Proposition 3). It should be stressed that the 
road pricing policies derived in Proposition 3 can be conducted without 
estimating the parameters of a, 13, 1, s, To and Cb. In practice, it can be 
attained simply by adjusting Na by means of the road tolls through trial and 
error. 
     On the other hand, if the time-varying fine toll is politically and 
technologically possible, then it should be charged in proportion to the 
queue length, but the number of road users should remain unchanged 
(Proposition 4). 
     Finally, we made a welfare comparison between these road toll regimes. 
It was shown that the road tolls are effective in reducing the social cost 
particularly in case of heavy bottleneck congestion. The ability to lessen 
the social cost of the uniform toll increases as the city size gets large 
although it is at most 50% of the ability of the fine toll. 
Footnote 
1 According to Small's (1982) estimates
, they are /3<a<ir. 
2 Even if Cb were associated with Nb
, most of the results obtained in 
this paper remain unchanged. 
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